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Abstract: In today’s world we appear to place a premium on happiness.  Happiness is 
often portrayed, directly or indirectly, as one of the key aims of education.  To suggest 
that education is concerned with promoting unhappiness or even despair would, in 
many contexts, seem outlandish.  This paper challenges these widely held views.  
Focusing on the work of the great Russian writer, Fyodor Dostoevsky, I argue that 
despair, the origins of which lie in our reflective consciousness, is a defining feature 
of human life.  Education, I suggest, should not be seen as a flight from despair but as 
a process of deepening our understanding of suffering and its potentially pivotal role 
in our humanisation.  In developing these ideas, I draw on Kierkegaard’s The Sickness 
Unto Death and Unamuno’s The Tragic Sense of Life in Men and Nations, among 
other sources. 
 







In the contemporary Western world, there is an obsession with ‘happiness’.  
Everyone, it seems, is expected to seek happiness and to avoid situations that might 
lead to unhappiness.  Consistent with the wider process of marketisation, happiness 
has become a commodity: something to be sold, advertised and consumed.  
Educationists, while often critical of broader social and economic trends, have for the 
most part accepted the centrality of happiness for human life, and have typically 
espoused teaching and learning goals and objectives consistent with this view.  Nel 
Noddings has argued: ‘Happiness and education are, properly, intimately related.  
Happiness should be an aim of education, and a good education should contribute 
significantly to personal and collective happiness’ (Noddings, 2003, p. 1).  Alternative 
terms have sometimes been employed to describe what is at stake in establishing 
desirable educational arrangements – reference might be made, for example, to being 
‘well adjusted’ or having ‘high self-esteem’, or to achieving a sense of ‘well being’, 
or to the development of a ‘positive outlook’ – but the underlying assumptions in each 
case are frequently the same.  It is taken as given that education should make us feel 
better, not worse, and that teachers have a responsibility to prepare students to 
become happy, well integrated, contributing citizens in their lives beyond schools. 
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 The idea that education is, at least in part, concerned with promoting 
unhappiness – and perhaps even despair – is very much at odds with the dominant 
trends of our time.  Of course, acknowledgement that some students are not happy is 
commonplace, and educationists have gone to considerable lengths to understand the 
causes of such unhappiness and to respond positively to such situations.  Where 
students are unhappy – and this may be in kindergartens, schools, or tertiary education 
institutions – we seek to address this as a ‘problem’ with ‘solutions’ that can range 
from changing subjects or classes, to acquiring new friends or interests, to 
counselling, and, increasingly, to drugs.  Seldom will the ailment be identified 
precisely as ‘despair’, but where this is the case, it will usually be taken for granted 
that such a state must be overcome and avoided.  Despair, where it is examined at all, 
will often be seen as the very anti-thesis of happiness, and education will be regarded 
as a means to lift us from this profound form of unhappiness to a more desirable state 
of mind.  To say that one is being well educated yet existing in a state of despair 
would thus seem to be a contradiction in terms.  The movement, as it is often 
depicted, should be from despair to hope – hope for a mode of being, or a set of 
psychological and behavioural attributes, or a social system where despair no longer 
figures prominently.1 
It is possible, however, to see despair, happiness and education in a somewhat 
different light, and this will be the task of the present paper.  Existentialists, from 
Kierkegaard onwards, have contributed much to our understanding of despair and its 
significance in the formation of the human being.  Situating the discussion in this 
longstanding tradition of existentialist thought,2 I shall argue that despair need not be 
seen an aberrant state from which we should seek to escape; rather, it is a key element 
of any well lived human life.  Education, I maintain, is meant to create a state of 
discomfort, and to this extent may also make us unhappy, but is all the more important 
for that.  Contrary to the spirit of our age, this paper suggests that apparent happiness 
can be dehumanising.  To be educated is, in part, to be aware of one’s despair, 
accepting of it, and able to work productively with it. 
I develop this argument via the work of Fyodor Dostoevsky, whose influence 
on later existentialist writers has been well recognised (see, for example, Kaufmann, 
1975; Marino, 2004).  I focus on two texts in particular: one, the extraordinarily 
influential novel, Notes from Underground (Dostoevsky, 2004); the other, the less 
well known story, ‘The Dream of a Ridiculous Man’ (Dostoevsky, 1997).  The former 
was published in 1864, and served as a kind of philosophical precursor to the great 
novels that were to follow: Crime and Punishment, The Idiot, Demons, and The 
Brothers Karamazov (Dostoevsky, 1993, 2001, 1994 and 1991 respectively).3  The 
latter first appeared in Dostoevsky’s A Writer’s Diary (Dostoevsky, 2009) near the 
end of his life.  Together, these two works capture Dostoevsky’s final assessment of 
the human condition (Magarshack, 2001).  It is a vision that is both tragic and 
hopeful.4 
 
                                                 
1 There is surprisingly little philosophical work on the significance of despair in educational life.  
Notable exceptions include Liston (2000), McKnight (2004), and Nielson (2006). 
2 Useful overviews of existentialism can be found in Barrett (1990), Cooper (1999), and Flynn (2009). 
3 For an exhaustive account of Dostoevsky’s life and work, see Frank (2010). 
4 In developing the argument in this paper I draw on ideas from Kierkegaard and Unamuno but in a 
strictly limited way.  The point of the paper is not to provide an in-depth analysis of the work of these 
thinkers; they are employed to inform aspects of the discussion, but the primary purpose is to consider 
what we can learn from the two texts by Dostoevsky that might be helpful in addressing questions of 
happiness and despair in education. 
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Tales from beneath and beyond 
 
Of all the novels for which Dostoevsky has become known, Notes from Underground 
is perhaps the most distinctive in its structure and content.  There are two parts to the 
book.  In Part One, simply entitled ‘Underground’, an anonymous narrator, confessing 
his wickedness (Dostoevsky, 2004, p. 5), presents a diatribe against the philosophy 
advanced by a group of unnamed ‘gentlemen’.  His addressees, we know from 
Dostoevsky’s other writings, are the ‘rational egoists’, a group of reformists headed 
by Nikolai Chernyshevsky whose ideas captured the Russian imagination in the 
middle of the 19th century.  The philosophy of rational egoism, as set out in 
Chernyshevsky’s book What is to be Done? (Chernyshevsky, 1989) and other works, 
posited that human actions and choices are determined by self-interest.  Rational 
egoists held that enlightened pursuit of one’s own interests was compatible with a 
love of humankind and would lead to the development of a happier, more harmonious 
society. 
 Against the ‘scientific’ certainty of rational egoism, the Underground Man 
asserts the importance of human willing and unpredictability.  He wants to protect his 
right to say ‘no’, even if this means suffering.   Human beings, the Underground Man 
shows, have frequently acted against their best interests, and they are often profoundly 
irrational in their character.  Reason, the Underground Man declares, knows only what 
it has managed to learn.  Reason has its limits, and this must be acknowledged in 
considering social ideals.  The Underground Man’s wish is to exist in a manner that 
will not merely satisfy his reasoning intellect but fulfil his whole capacity for living.  
It is, he claims, our individuality – our distinctive personal attributes, no matter how 
apparently ‘negative’ they may be – that we should want to maintain, and reason may 
or may not be a dominant element of living on these terms.  The features of human 
life that matter most, the Underground Man implies, are precisely those that lend 
themselves least well to ‘scientific’ planning, development and measurement 
(Dostoevsky, 2004, pp. 5-38). 
 The second part, ‘Apropos of the Wet Snow’, gives an account of three sets of 
events in the narrator’s life.  The first involves a plot by the Underground Man to 
bump into an officer he feels has wronged him.  The need for this revenge was 
occasioned, in the Underground Man’s mind, by the indifference of the officer 
towards him when the possibility of a fight presents itself in a bar.  When faced with 
the Underground Man blocking his way, the officer simply lifts him by the shoulders 
and moves him aside.  The Underground Man seeks a remedy for his humiliation by 
planning, in great detail, a scenario where he will hold his line on a public walkway 
and bump into the officer.  After careful preparation, including the purchase of new 
clothes especially for the event, he completes his manoeuvre and asserts his rapture at 
having done so (pp. 47-53). 
 The second key episode focuses on the Underground Man’s brief renewal of 
an association with a group of school acquaintances.  His school fellows are 
organising a dinner to farewell one of their number.  They regard the Underground 
Man as an object of scorn, barely worthy of any attention except by way of ridicule, 
but after some reluctance allow him to attend the dinner.  The evening proves 
disastrous for the Underground Man, who is either ignored or treated with mockery 
and derision.  All drink heavily, and the Underground Man can longer contain 
himself, launching into an angry speech, the incoherence of which he is painfully 
aware as he proceeds.  Crushed by the contempt of his colleagues, he withdraws from 
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them and is left to stew in his thoughts.  He works himself into a sweat, pacing about 
on his own in a state of extreme agitation, while the others spend their time in relaxed 
merriment.  His emotions swinging wildly, he suddenly implores the others to forgive 
him, to which they respond with further mockery.  The others depart for a brothel, and 
eventually the Underground Man too makes his way there, only to find his tormenters 
have left (pp. 57-80). 
 The final episode in Part Two of the book then unfolds when the Underground 
Man meets Liza, a prostitute, with whom he strikes up a conversation.  After asking 
Liza a series of questions about her background, the Underground Man gives her a 
lecture on the dangers of her profession and then waxes lyrically on goodness and 
love, before being overcome with a need to be cruel.  His words reduce Liza to utter 
despair, after which he again feels a need to seek forgiveness.  He asks Liza to visit 
him in his underground hovel.  Within a few days, she appears, proving to be a 
compassionate listener as the Underground Man unloads his troubles on her.  Faced 
with such a giving nature, his own sense of self-worth is again undermined and he 
cannot resist another urge to be cruel.  Liza leaves and he is once more left to rue his 
actions, his notes providing a means for punishment as he reflects on the pain he has 
both suffered and inflicted (pp. 80-119). 
 By comparison with Notes from Underground, ‘The Dream of a Ridiculous 
Man’ is more conventional in its structure but no less striking in its content.  The story 
begins with the key character, again unnamed and known merely as the Ridiculous 
Man, describing his own ridiculousness and declaring his wish to commit suicide.  He 
claims that whatever he did, it would ‘make no difference’ (Dostoevsky, 1997, p. 
297).  Weeks go by while he waits for the right moment and having decided finally on 
a night to commit the deed, he is interrupted in the street by a young girl who pleads 
with him for help.  The Ridiculous Man infers from the girl’s actions that her mother 
is in urgent need of attention, but he does not want to become involved.  He suggests 
that she find a policeman but the girl, desperate for assistance, gives up on the 
Ridiculous Man and rushes towards another person on the street.  Troubled by this 
experience and aware also of noise in the apartment next to him, the Ridiculous Man 
nonetheless remains firm in his resolve to kill himself.  A revolver at the ready, he sits 
down but after some time falls asleep. 
 Unable to kill himself while awake, he does so in a dream.  In his dream he is 
buried but his coffin is later opened and he is taken away by a mysterious being, who 
carries him for what seems like many thousands of kilometres through space.  He 
eventually finds himself on a planet much like our earth, where he encounters a group 
of people living in an apparent paradise.  The physical environment is wondrous, with 
tall trees, glittering grass, resplendent flowers, birds flying freely and fearlessly, and 
waves lapping gently against the sea shore.  The people he finds there live in complete 
harmony with their surroundings and with each other.  They sing, play and work 
together happily.  They all share in child rearing duties.  They do not feel envy, anger, 
sorrow, or shame.  They have no knowledge of deceit or hatred and exist in a state of 
total love with all that exists.  They have no science but instead have a form of higher 
understanding, where they know how to live without the need for a science of life. 
 This purity of this utopian bubble is punctured dramatically, however, by the 
Ridiculous Man himself, who, by his own assessment, brings about the Fall of his 
blissful companions on the other earth.  Millennia pass but eventually the corrupting 
influences so prevalent in his original earthly home come into being: lies, resentment, 
cruelty, factionalism, and fighting.  Crime appears and laws become necessary.  From 
the innocence of love for all, people now separate themselves from each other, 
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speaking different languages, building new alliances, and seeking solace in forms of 
religious observance that had previously not been needed.  The strong dominate the 
weak.  There is much suffering and people find it difficult to recover the happiness 
that had earlier prevailed. 
 The Ridiculous Man loves his companions all the more for their suffering but 
is full of remorse for what he has done.  He asks to be crucified but the people do not 
allow this.  In time, he is considered dangerous and is threatened with the madhouse.  
This fills him with such sorrow that he suddenly awakens from the dream.  He finds 
himself in the chair where he had sat down to kill himself and immediately pushes the 
revolver away in horror.  He now wishes, more than ever before, to live – and to tell 
others of the truth he has seen in his dream.  He is ridiculed by others for his 
preaching but is unswerving in his conviction that happiness and beauty can be 
created on earth, if only human beings can follow the simple principle of loving others 
as themselves.  He finds the little girl again and affirms his intention to go on. 
 
 
Consciousness, despair and education 
 
 
There is no love of life without despair of life. 
– Albert Camus (1968, p. 56) 
 
The connection between Notes from Underground and ‘The Dream of a Ridiculous 
Man’ is pivotal in understanding the fundamental energies at work in Dostoevsky’s 
fiction.  When Dostoevsky wrote Notes from Underground, it was as if he had 
suddenly found the voice he had been looking for all his writing life.  In the 
Underground Man we find, for the first time, the coiled tensions, contradictions and 
frailties of the Dostoevskian individual on display, vividly and dramatically.  In this 
short novel we also see the brutality of human relations, the alienation that 
characterises many lives, and the sense of loss and longing that would figure so 
prominently in Dostoevsky’s later work.  We find that the human being is not one but 
many, and discover that our knowledge not only of the world but of ourselves will 
inevitably fall short of what we regard as ideal.  Wrapped up in the Underground Man 
– in his expressed beliefs, his circumstances, and the events he describes – is 
everything that was to give Dostoevsky’s work its literary power. 
 The Ridiculous Man needs to be seen as the Underground Man’s brother – 
perhaps even an unidentical twin.  These two characters differ from each other in 
some important respects, but there are definite family resemblances: both are 
‘outsiders’; both have a kind of hyper-consciousness of themselves and their 
surroundings; both wish to reach out to others (even if this is not evident at first 
glance) but struggle to do so effectively.  Perhaps most notably, given the focus of this 
paper, both the Underground Man and the Ridiculous Man live in despair.  Their lives 
are filled with a sense of disgust as they examine themselves and the world.  The 
Underground Man is the very embodiment of unhappiness – a thoroughly miserable 
creature, destined, it seems, to live with his sense of failure and his alienation from 
others for the rest of his days.  The Ridiculous Man, initially on the brink of ending it 
all, discovers through his dream what appears to be absolute happiness: a group of 
people for whom all is light and joy, living free of worries, full of love for each other 
and for their world.  From this encounter, his own life finds renewed sustenance, and 
the Ridiculous Man has a fervent desire to teach others about the secret of the 
happiness he has found.  This state of innocence and happiness may, however, also be 
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a condition of despair.  In The Sickness unto Death, Kierkegaard (1989) maintains that 
even those who appear to be furthest from despair may in fact be in despair.5  The 
heart of happiness, Kierkegaard argues, can be despair’s ‘choicest dwelling-place’ (p. 
55).  ‘A sense of security and repose’, similarly, ‘may mean that one is in despair’ (p. 
54): 
 
Even what is humanly speaking the most beautiful and loveliest thing of all – a womanly 
youthfulness which is sheer peace and harmony and joy – is nevertheless despair.  For while it 
can be counted the greatest good fortune, good fortune is not a specification of spirit, and 
deep, deep inside, deep within good fortune’s most hidden recesses, there dwells also the 
dread that is despair. (p. 55) 
 
What is it that is missing in the apparently perfect world encountered by the 
Ridiculous Man?  I would argue that it is the impulse to life.  The basis for the 
tranquillity and harmony that prevails among the pre-corrupted other earth dwellers is 
their absolute integration with each other and with the rest of nature.  This can be seen 
as a form of death.  Separation of a certain kind, painful as this is, is necessary for 
life.  The beginnings of this separation lie in something that makes us distinctively 
human: our capacity for reflective consciousness. 
Dostoevsky believed that the origin of consciousness was suffering.  He saw 
suffering as necessary for anyone wanting to write well (see Pevear, 2002, p. 497), 
and he showed repeatedly, through his portraits of key characters, that suffering 
played a key role in the development of a heightened sense of self-awareness.  Yet, 
the reverse is also true: consciousness is the origin of suffering.  A pivotal element in 
the Fall of the idyllic other earth dwellers – and it must be remembered that the Fall is 
initiated by the Ridiculous Man – is their loss of innocence and the emergence of a 
new form of consciousness.  They start to theorise, to invent ideas and concepts, to 
critique their former mode of life.  Science and laws and slavery arrive.   With these 
changes, suffering arises.  However, far from wanting to deny this, the people come to 
love their sorrow.  They reach the very position Dostoevsky himself articulated in 
describing the creative process: they seek suffering and come to believe that ‘truth is 
attained only through suffering’ (Dostoevsky, 1997, p. 314).6 
In seeking to understand the relationship between consciousness and suffering, 
Unamuno (1972) is particularly insightful: 
 
Suffering is the way of consciousness, and it is through suffering that living beings achieve 
self-consciousness.  To possess consciousness of oneself, to have personality, is to know and 
feel oneself distinct from other beings.  And this feeling of distinctiveness is reached only 
through a collision, through more or less severe suffering, through a sense of one’s own limits.  
                                                 
5 To better appreciate Kierkegaard’s position, we would need to examine his other works, particularly 
those where the themes of despair and dread figures prominently such as Either/Or (Kierkegaard, 
1987) and The Concept of Anxiety (Kierkegaard, 1980), but also the philosophical overviews provided 
in Philosophical Fragments (Kierkegaard, 1985) and Concluding Unscientific Postscript (Kierkegaard, 
2009), together with the ‘inspirational’ writings such as Stages on Life’s Way (Kierkegaard, 1988) and 
Works of Love (Kierkegaard, 1998).  Such an exploration is, however, beyond the scope of the present 
paper.  Helpful analyses of Kierkegaard’s account of despair can be found in Kosch (2006), McKnight 
(2004) and Nielson (2006). 
6 Of course, suffering and despair are not equivalents, though they are closely related to each other.  
Despair might be seen as a specific form of suffering: a state that persists for some time, as a kind of 
shadow that accompanies a person.  One of the respondents to this paper, Frédérique Brossard 
Børhaug, put it beautifully when she described despair as an ‘ethical backlight’ in a human life: 
something that remains present throughout but which does not necessarily prevent us from also 
experiencing moments of happiness.  What Dostoevsky and Unamuno have to say about suffering also 
applies to despair as it is understood in this paper. 
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Consciousness of oneself is simply consciousness of one’s own limitation.  I feel that I am 
myself when I feel that I am not others; to know and feel the extent of my being is to know 
where I cease being, the point beyond which I no longer am. (p. 154) 
 
Unamuno goes on to ask: ‘How would one know one existed unless one suffered in 
some measure?  How turn inward, achieve reflective consciousness, unless it be 
through suffering?’ (p. 154).  In pleasure, he says, we forget ourselves – forget our 
own existence.  This, for Unamuno, is not a form of liberation but a process of 
alienation – of literally becoming an alien being.  Thus, while we might acknowledge 
the alienation from other selves suffered by the Underground Man and the Ridiculous 
Man, if Unamuno is right the blissful inhabitants of the other earth are alienated from 
themselves – from the distinctive attributes that affirm their existence as human 
beings.  For Unamuno, reflective consciousness – knowing that we know – is a 
disease, but one from which we cannot escape (p. 22).  Existentially, we must live 
with this sickness, just as the body learns to accommodate the germs of a physical 
disease.  The idea of health is, as Unamuno sees it, an abstract category – an 
impossibility – but if this were not so, ‘we might say that a perfectly healthy man 
would no longer be a man but an irrational animal: irrational for want of any disease 
to ignite his reason’ (p. 25). 
 We often think of despair as something to be avoided, perhaps more so than 
almost anything else, yet it is possible to not only accept despair but to embrace it as a 
stroke of good fortune.  This is not in any way to diminish or deny the pain 
experienced by those in despair, nor to advocate that we impose despair on others ‘for 
their own good’.  It is rather to recognise that if we are to humanise ourselves – and I 
am using this term rather narrowly in this context to mean realising our capacity for 
reflective thought – despair is inevitable.7  It is the way we work with despair, and 
allow it to work on us, that is crucial in pedagogical terms.  As Kierkegaard (1989) 
observes, while the actual experience of despair is, on multiple levels, horrific, in the 
possibility of despair we find what is most deeply human about us (pp. 44-45).  Of 
despair as an illness, an ailment we all face, Kierkegaard believes we can say this: ‘it 
is truly providential to get it, even though it is the most dangerous of sicknesses if one 
does not want to be cured of it’ (p. 56).8  Here I think Kierkegaard is only partially 
right.  This is a sickness that defines us as human beings and it is potentially a 
dangerous disease.  It seems to me, however, that we do not have to think of wanting 
                                                 
7 I am not suggesting that reflection constitutes the whole of the humanisation process but simply 
noting that it is an important part of it.  For a broader account of humanisation, see Roberts (2000). 
8 Kierkegaard’s concept of despair is also linked to the question of choice.  In recent decades, with 
neoliberalism in the ascendency, the notion of choice has been denuded of much of its original 
existential force.  Unlike neoliberals, for whom the question of choice is largely limited to consumer 
style preferences in the market, Kierkegaard speaks of choosing in relation to modes of life.  Our 
experience of despair is, in part, dependent upon the extent to which, and the ways in which, we choose 
the self that we become.  For Kierkegaard, choice is a key element in distinguishing between aesthetic, 
ethical and religious forms of life.  The aesthetic mode, centred on the idea of gaining pleasure from 
external objects, does not involve the authentic creation of a self.  For the aesthete, ‘[n]o genuine 
choice is made because nothing significant happens.  One’s inherent need for transcendence and 
meaning is repressed.  The outcome is a pervasive feeling of estrangement, melancholy and despair’ 
(Golomb, 1992, p. 76).  The ethical sphere involves reflective commitment but, in its reliance on 
abstract and universalist principles, ‘depersonalizes the self, suppressing spontaneous, passionate self-
expression’ and thus prevents the human being from forming him- or herself as a unique individual (p. 
76).  In this realm, one becomes wracked with guilt in being unable to live up to ethical ideals and also 
falls into despair.  The ethical stage prepares the way, however, for authentic faith: the risky, uncertain, 
passionate choice to create one’s true self, inwardly rather than merely externally, in the religious life 
(pp. 76-78). 
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to be cured of despair as an illness.  And the basis for objecting to this 
characterisation of despair – as something that must be cured or overcome – does not 
have to be discomfort with the theistic nature of Kierkegaard’s solution; rather, it is 
the very notion that a cure is necessary or possible.  I shall try to show that despair is 
not a condition for which a cure can be found; rather, we must learn to live with it, 
and this is one of the key elements of educational development. 
If education is, among other things, a process a deepening understanding – of 
extending and enhancing consciousness – some searching ethical questions arise, 
particularly for those of us who work as teachers.  For it is not merely a matter of 
recognising that we all suffer from despair; it is also necessary to acknowledge that 
we may play a role in increasing despair among those we teach.  In fostering the 
development of a reflective or critical consciousness, we also open up the possibility 
of greater suffering.9  Kierkegaard warns us: ‘It is the rising level of consciousness, or 
the degree to which it rises, that is the continual intensification of despair: the more 
consciousness the more intense the despair’ (p. 72).  This helps us to understand why 
the Underground Man suffers so acutely (he sees himself as more educated than those 
with whom he interacts and his hyper-consciousness is in evidence throughout), and 
we may appreciate Kierkegaard’s point by reflecting on our own educational 
experiences.  But do we have a right as teachers to risk inflicting such suffering on 
others? 
There is no simple answer to this question.  One way to respond is to say that 
temporary suffering is necessary if later benefits are to accrue.  Acceptance of a 
version of this line of argument is commonplace.  We often believe, for example, that 
the stress involved in completing school tasks – assignments, examinations, and the 
like – over many years will find ample compensation in the opportunities to attend 
university and secure a better job than would otherwise be the case.  Or, we support 
the idea of children undergoing years of arduous practice in learning a musical 
instrument on the grounds that they will be grateful for having been pushed in this 
way by the time they reach adulthood.  The notion of ‘no pain, no gain’ is also 
routinely applied when seeking to improve ourselves physically, by, for instance, 
beginning a running programme or joining a gym. 
Yet, it seems to me that there is something unsatisfactory in these forms of 
justification, at least when it comes to examining despair and its relation to education.  
There is an instrumentalist logic lurking in the background here, where it is assumed 
that there is an endpoint of some kind: the ‘reward’ for the suffering.  The experience 
of despair is, however, arguably something from which we can never fully escape.  
This applies especially when we think of the role education plays in deepening our 
consciousness, and thereby, in Kierkegaard’s and Unamuno’s terms, heightening our 
sense of despair.  The despair of education lies, at least partially, in not being able to 
go back.  Short of being subject to sophisticated techniques of ‘brainwashing’, or of 
being drugged into stupefaction, or of developing a brain altering illness (such as 
Alzheimer’s disease), we cannot ‘unlearn’ what has already been acquired.  I am not 
talking here of factual information (that might easily be forgotten as the years pass) 
but rather of qualitative changes in our being – states of mind, ways of thinking, forms 
of emotional development that emerge, gradually but surely, through the process of 
educational formation.  We may find, for example, that our enjoyment of certain types 
of entertainment will diminish as we come to recognise their relative shallowness; or, 
                                                 
9 I shall use the terms ‘reflective’ and ‘critical’ interchangeably in this paper, mindful however of the 
fact that they need not be seen as equivalents in all contexts.  
 9 
we may experience greater distress when watching the news, feeling more intense 
anger at reports of corruption or exploitation, or more sadness and compassion when 
viewing the effects of natural or humanly created disasters. 
If we seek through education to enhance the development of critical, reflective 
consciousness in students, and we do so effectively, we intervene in their lives in a 
way that will leave a permanent mark.  We risk playing a direct or indirect role in 
making those students unhappy, not merely for short periods in classrooms but in the 
very way they think about themselves, and the world, in their everyday activities 
thereafter.  If instrumentalist justifications for an intervention of this kind are 
inadequate, a more promising line of defence might be to draw a comparison with 
some of the alternatives.  We might say that developing a critical, and in that sense 
despairing, consciousness is better than deliberately ‘dumbing down’ the curriculum 
or simply seeking to pump facts into students’ minds.  Apart from being undesirable 
in themselves, we could argue, such approaches bring a host of other negative 
consequences.  A pedagogical system that works against the formation of critically 
conscious beings allows social injustices to continue without contestation, undermines 
notions of informed consent in decision making situations (e.g., at the polling booth, 
or in a hospital), and closes off the possibility of new forms of experience that 
demand greater intellectual sophistication. 
Even here, though, there is a sense that something of the spirit of 
Dostoevsky’s, Kierkegaard’s and Unamuno’s work has been lost.  These thinkers are 
so effective in portraying, in their different ways, the tragedy of the human condition 
because they recognise the tensions, the uncertainties associated with processes of 
human becoming.  It is true that both Dostoevsky and Kierkegaard ultimately settled 
on faith-based ethical preferences, but neither did so without experiencing first-hand 
the deep-seated tensions portrayed so effectively in their published works.  
Dostoevsky, I believe, remained conflicted in his thinking about God and morality 
(see further, Kelly, 1988; Roberts, 2005), and with Kierkegaard, a master of literary 
seduction (Sæverot, 2011), we cannot even be certain of who the ‘real’ author is.  
Indeed, we are wrong to seek one, and should simply let the different voices of his 
various pseudonyms work on us as Kierkegaard, or the multiple Kierkegaards, hoped 
they might.  Kierkegaard was, in one sense, profoundly honest in his philosophical 
labours – probing, with great courage, where few before him had dared to go – but he 
was also deceptive.  Never being able to quite ‘pin him down’, to ascertain his ‘true’ 
views, may be exasperating, but it can also have pedagogical value.  Deceit, as 
Sæverot (2010) has argued, can be educative. 
What these thinkers, and many others in the existentialist tradition, have to 
teach us is that we can never uncover all the mysteries of reality, never be sure of the 
moral ground on which our actions are based, never fully know ourselves.  Education, 
I suggest, is also like this: it allows us not to become more confident in our answers to 
some of life’s deepest riddles but more appreciative of how much we do not know.  In 
this respect, we are much indebted to a line of thinkers stretching back, in the West, at 
least as far as Socrates.  Becoming less certain of our certainties, as the influential 
Brazilian educationist Paulo Freire recognised, does not mean we need to be any less 
committed to social action and the ideal of building a better world (Freire, 1994, 1997, 
1998; Roberts, 2010).  Unamuno, in describing the nature of his own work, takes a 
similar stance: 
 
Whoever perseveres and reads on will see how, out of this abyss of despair, hope my emanate, 
and how this crucial point may serve as [a] source for human, profoundly human, effort and 
action, may serve the cause of solidarity and even of progress.  The reader who perseveres and 
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reads on will discover a pragmatic justification.  And he will see that to work and to be 
morally effective there is no need to count on either of the two opposed certitudes, no need to 
depend on the certainty of faith or the certainty of reason, and even less need to evade – ever – 
the problem of the immortality of the soul, or to distort it idealistically, that is, hypocritically.  
The reader will see that this uncertainty, the suffering, and the fruitless struggle to escape 
uncertainty, can be and are a basis for action and a foundation for morals. (pp. 141-142) 
 
In pondering what this mode of thinking might mean for suffering and education, 
Simone Weil (1997) is helpful: we should, she says, love suffering because it is, not 
because it is ‘useful’ (p. 131).  This implies that the problem of suffering is 
ontological, ethical and educational.  Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard and Unamuno show 
that to be human is to suffer – to experience despair.  We are suffering (an ontological 
proposition), and to love suffering (an ethical task), as Weil counsels us to do, is to 
love ourselves – that is, commit ourselves to the task of becoming more fully human 
(an educational matter). 
 Education, when considered from this starting point, does not provide an 
escape from suffering but a growing awareness of it.  Such an approach differs 
substantially from the prevailing view described at the beginning of this paper.  
Education, by allowing us to recognise our own despair as well as the suffering of 
others, is an unsettling, uncomfortable process.  To commit to education takes great 
courage, for teaching and learning, where they are connected with the development of 
a critical consciousness, are inherently risky activities.  Today, we often seek 
predictability, and set up elaborate systems of measurement and evaluation to try and 
ensure we obtain this.  We think of education as working with knowledge – with that 
which is known – but it is, if anything, more a matter of stepping into the unknown.  
To be educated, and I am speaking here of education as a task rather than an 
achievement, is to not only accept but actively embrace uncertainty. 
 Conceived in these terms, education is anything but a smooth, easy process; it 
is difficult, messy, complex, and necessarily lifelong.  Once the process has begun, it 
cannot be stopped.  To be educated is to live, constantly, with tensions – and the most 
important of those tensions, between hope and despair, can never be resolved.  This is 
what the Underground Man lives out, in a particularly dramatic way.  He sits for much 
of the time scowling and ranting (internally, as well as in his Notes) in his 
subterranean hovel, the very embodiment of despair, yet he also experiences moments 
of hope – generated largely but not exclusively by his encounters with Liza.  He has, 
despite appearances to the contrary, started on a process of what we might refer to as 
educative redemption.  The Notes themselves are an important part of this process, 
providing a means for reflection and a ‘purging’ of distressing thoughts.  The 
Underground Man who composes the Notes is fifteen or sixteen years the senior of the 
younger one he describes in Part Two of the book.  That older man, as Rosenshield 
(1984) shows, takes full responsibility for his earlier actions, experiencing guilt for 
them but also becoming more genuinely compassionate as he reflects on his relations 
with Liza. 
 The Underground Man’s commitment to others is hampered by his egoism and 
pride, yet he has a nuanced, complex understanding of himself.  The Ridiculous Man 
has a fervent wish to pass on his newly discovered truth to others, but has further 
work to do in comprehending the circumstances that led to his initial suicidal 
thoughts.  The Underground Man is aware of his despair yet perhaps not as fully 
cognisant of how far he has come, by the time he authors his Notes, in addressing this.  
‘Addressing’ it does not mean overcoming it but reflecting upon it, accepting it, and 
responding to it.  The Ridiculous Man, by the end of his tale, lives on more peaceful 
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terms with himself than is the case with the Underground Man, but this is in part 
because he has not faced up fully to himself and his despair.  His solution to his 
despair is based purely on revelation, but the content of the dream itself suggests more 
than this will be needed.  His dream is a step along the way in that process, but in his 
new vocation of preaching – of conveying the truth he has found – he may discover 
that through the act of teaching others, he also learns from them.  Of pivotal 
importance, both the Underground Man and the Ridiculous Man go on, and this, to 
use Kierkegaard’s phrase but in a different way, is the ‘leap of faith’ we all must take 
if we commit ourselves to the process of education.  With education, we risk it all 
every time we seek to teach or to learn: we risk overturning what we think we know, 
undermining our values and beliefs, severing our sense of security and our reason for 
being.  The uncertainty, the unpredictability, of education is what makes it both a 





Where does this leave us in thinking about happiness and education?  If the ideas 
considered in this paper have any weight, our obsession with happiness as the 
‘resolution’ to all of life’s difficulties must be seen as misguided.  This is not to 
suggest that happiness is unimportant; nor does it imply a position ‘against’ 
happiness.  Happiness, for most of us, is a vital component of a good life – but it need 
not be the goal to which we should always aspire.  We can experience happiness in a 
multitude of different ways, many of which have little or no connection with 
dominant constructions of ‘the happy life’.  Education has a key contribution to make 
in highlighting some of those possibilities.  There is much that could be done, also, in 
exploring the myriad ways in which teaching and learning can themselves become 
joyous activities.  But this need not deter us from facing up to the question of despair.   
 Despair is not a temporary medical condition but a defining feature of human 
existence.  The screams of despair that characterise human lives cannot be ‘drowned 
out’ with healthy doses of happiness.  As Kierkegaard argues, even those who appear 
most happy, most content, may nevertheless be in despair.  The genesis of despair, 
Dostoevsky and Unamuno show, lies in our capacity for reflective consciousness.  
Education, to the extent that it enhances the development of this distinctively human 
quality, is thus complicit in the promotion of despair.  We cannot escape from despair 
but must learn to live with it.10  Despair need not provide a reason for inaction or 
indifference; to the contrary, it can serve as the basis on which a passionate 
commitment to life may proceed.  Education, as it has been interpreted here, does not 
make us happier but it can enable us to more deeply understand the suffering we and 
others experience.  Happiness in its commodified form, as a kind of drug to be 
marketed and administered in regular doses, takes us not closer to our humanity but 
further away from it.  Education has a critical role to play in allowing us to go on – 
accepting the risk of unhappiness, of uncertainty, and of continuous change. 
                                                 
10 This does not imply the abandonment of hope; quite the opposite, in fact.  While it is true that despair 
can be understood as a state of being or a situation ‘without hope’, it is also possible to see despair as 
the very condition that gives hope substance and meaning.  Hope, as it were, ‘comes into its own’ when 
despair is identified, understood and addressed.  Hope and despair, as Paulo Freire (1972, 1994, 1997, 
1998) showed, are intimately connected.  Expressions of hope in times of relative harmony and 
prosperity can sometimes appear somewhat empty.  It is when circumstances are most desperate that 
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